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Art’s political criticality: 






This text is an exercise in intertextually reading Plato’s Republic and Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s The Gay Science, in their provocative suggestions surrounding the 
unbound merge of art with life, the interference of aesthetics with ethico-politics, 
and, furthermore, the implication of the sensual and the imaginary to knowledge 
production and the political. For such “reading,” the measures and rules are to be 
invented or re-invented in the very process of this dialogical meditation. My own 
point of departure for this juxtaposition, from one side Plato who is arguably 
among the most revered founding figures of the canon of Western reason, and on 
the other, Nietzsche, who is the most revered of irreverent thinkers, rightly seen as 
the precursor of poststructuralism, is the way in which the notion of the 
disinterestedly aesthetic is problematized and complicated, in fact, put into 
question, in both texts. Art is not merely about what the Western metaphysics has 
established as a non-political ideal of aesthetic pleasure (i.e., Kant’s transcendental 
aesthetic), the two texts seem to suggest. Although the two authors engage the 
problem of art’s non-innocence and its encumbered implication in the political in 
different ways, art, in both renderings, point to the various and unpredictable ways 
in which it can be enacted as critique.   
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As the risks of aestheticization continue to contentiously engage art, the 
old but persistent question of the politics of representation gains new currency in 
discussions of critical theory today. Could we prompt anew the question of art 
from the standpoint of the social and political exigencies of our times and of 
different localities? Could we address and reimagine art as a means to contest 
contemporary predicaments of power such as racist and gendered violence, 
capitalist governmentality, financialisation, war biopolitics, and the emergence of 
authoritarianism in Western democracies? What can art’s criticality be under 
these conditions? Even though it is not in the scope of this essay to analyze the 
present with and through art, nonetheless, a historical sense of temporality is 
underlying here as I (re)turn to two “old” texts to think through the contemporary 
question of how to trouble the hegemonic ways of being in the world; how to 
configure the world as a world “Of everyone. Of all worlds,” as Achille Mbembe 
punctuates in his Critique of Black Reason—an ambiguous gesture towards Kant’s 
classic (p. 180). The two texts I am reading here together point to art as a political 
act of posing the question of the world in the present tense, which strives beyond 
and against the present order of the polis and the ethicopolitical.1     
Plato/Socrates considers the productive status of art, and understands the 
poietic within the horizon of bringing-into-presence; Nietzsche calls for an artistic 
experience which attains its form as a “devaluation of all values.” Aesthetics 
uncannily touches upon the entire sphere of the ethicopolitical. In Socrates/Plato, 
the encounter is potentially fatal and ruinous to the orderly timeless structure of 
the polis, due to an absolute—albeit ambivalent—danger, “divine terror,” inherent 
in the (mimetic) poetry; in Nietzsche, art is understood as a vital counterforce of 
temporality thought of in the dimension of life, becoming, creative impulse, and 
self-generation, conjoined with the eternal recurrence of the Same, in a circle of 
actively and wilfully unsettling the universal and absolute foundations of the 
world of truth. The critical question would be whether there is a subversion 
beyond the repetition of the dominant political and social categories; whether 
there can be a re-enactment that lies unavoidably within and, at the same time, 
dynamically beyond the dialectic of appropriation and its implications of order, 
literalness, and ownership; or whether there can ever be a transgressive 
reinscription that is not recuperable by the dominant order. What is at stake, then, 
is a consideration of the propriety and property of mimetic iterability itself: the 
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possibilities (for subversion) and also the perils (of renormalization) it entails. The 
question (to be sure, not in the sense of question that waits to be resolved but 
rather of aporia that enables as much as complicates the possibility of our 
reflections over and over again) is this: What would it take to radicalize 
citationality so as to dis-place it or even re-invent it beyond (the proper place of) 
its discursive limits, beyond its sociosymbolic premises of penetration and 
containment, and beyond the semantic horizon of the existing intelligible itself—
given that “horizon” figures a certain finality of what is possible (the word ορίζων 
signals the όριο, limit). 
 In what follows, the interwoven notions of repetition, relationality, 
approximation, and distance will be explored. Such nexus of concepts is embodied 
in Nietzsche’s own relationship with Plato. One of the turns that have marked 
Nietzsche’s philosophical itinerary has been his preoccupation with 
Plato/Socrates; an act of re-collection of his own philosophic and affective 
genealogies, a gesture of witnessing to a concomitance and co-extensivity with his 
philosophical past despite his critical even ironic engagement with it. Even though 
his writing seems to be an ironic disruption of the Platonic metaphysically 
tradition, it also ironically echoes a certain intimacy with it. 2  Nietzsche’s 
encountering with, or receiving of, Plato/Socrates redraws, perhaps, the contours 
of the very field of philosophical kinship, a kinship, however, whose multitude of 
forces remains in the vicissitudes of language and whose rearticulations are not 
fully to be anticipated. 3  
 
The political mimesis of poetry  
The dialogue of The Republic revolves around the pursuit of questing after and 
questioning about “the good,” and more accurately, about the good beyond being 
and above essence (epekeina tis ousias).4  Such pursuit assumes, in the Platonic-
Socratic moral force and utopic 5  discourse of the ideal form of a rationally 
organized body politic, a connotation of phantasmatically capturing a universal 
and absolute morality; a morality, however, which, although imagined as a closed 
and inclusive pragmatic synthesis, is elusive enough to desist from the present of 
our immediate knowledge and definitive grasp. At the same time, this morality is 
exclusive, most notably, exclusively male and patriarchal.6  How to adequately 
know about “the good”—both in the ontological dimension of the question (what 
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is the good) and its topological/locational dimension (where does the good take 
place)? Considering that Plato/Socrates’ challenge as a teacher was to teach 
ignorance, to teach how to suspend knowledge, the questing after “the good” is a 
pursuit with certain limitations, a pursuit of what is always in a state of evading 
or escaping. The cognitive grasp of “the good,” then, as an object of epistemic and 
ontic search, is an elusive and aporetic moral system, one that is discursively 
idealized and pursued as always already “yet to come.”  Hence the poietic 
projection of the Republic as a paradigmatic moral edification institutionalized, a 
transcendent normalizing ground of the ideal conception of the true and the 
moral. 
   Why is Republic’s moral order, in both its prescriptive pragmatics and 
idealized transcendence, so fatally threatened by the (mimetic) poetry? What is at 
stake when some forms of mimesis (i.e., eidola) are excluded from the idea and 
the place of the good? What is the role that a certain distinction between the Same 
and the Other plays in the constitution of the terms of such exclusion? And 
further, how are we to unravel what Plato refers to in the last book of the Republic 
as the “old animosity” between philosophy and art, or philosophy and poetry?7  
 What is at stake in the Republic is the attainment and preservation of the 
integrity and harmony of the just city, but also of the human as hypo-keimenon, 
subject to the abiding presence of the unitary community. As a rationally 
organized society founded on the notion of communal property and collective 
interest, the Politeia rests upon an authoritative anxiety over the eventuality of 
citizens’ distance from the community. The term Politeia denotes the practice of 
constituting a political space and mode of collective life in conditions of plurality 
and difference—multiple and different institutions, laws, practices, and 
boundaries. 8  The full body of the Politeia, as a single enclosed space and a 
bounded and self-contained topos, necessitates uninterrupted closedness and 
orderly inclusiveness, organic unity and harmony among its multiple and 
different (body) parts. (The etymology is suggestive: Gk. melos signifies both 
“member” of a societal whole and body “part.” The etymological conflation with 
melōidia, melody [the rhythmic, harmonized arrangement of single tones], is 
interesting in both the Republic and the Gay Science, as we will see in a moment.) 
Such is the synecdoche essential to any project of phantasizing, designing, or 
safeguarding the creation (pro-creation) of a body politic. In imagining the best 
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citizens of the ideal city, Plato/Socrates describes them as citizens who 
unequivocally prioritize the community’s interest above any private one. The 
ethics of the Republic bespeaks an impulse to imagine and design a new or 
renewed ethico-political system through the technē of border-drawing, of defining 
the boundaries between what belongs to the body politic and what must be kept 
outside.  The valued harmony of the ideal city-state is, above all, a harmony 
between bodily boundaries and the bounds of the body politic, between the 
definitely contoured polis and its members’ definitely contoured subjectivities, 
tasks, and poietic involvements. Socrates/Plato is clear in his mono-thematic 
consideration of human activity: each citizen must engage in –submit to- one 
single task. The imitator does not belong with the polis, then, because, by virtue 
of her/his upsetting the proximity to the origin, the formal archē, s/he signifies 
the possibility of infinite doubleness and manifoldness; a possibility, that is, of 
putting into question the originality and intelligibility of the single and 
transcendent truth, and, therefore, a possibility that lends itself to unjustness: 
“Perhaps you would say he doesn’t harmonize with our regime because there is no 
double man among us, nor a manifold one, since each man does one thing.”9  
Boundaries and contours are there to be revered and preserved in the Socratic-
Platonic polis. (We may venture the interjection—till a precocious one, but, 
hopefully, to be clarified later—that in their Nietzschean form, boundaries are 
there to be blurred and mocked, crossed, interrupted, and transgressed: signifiers 
of legitimation in Plato/Socrates, signifiers of dissent in Nietzsche.)  
 In the course of the examination of poetry in Book III, mimesis is 
discussed and discredited as a reproduction of likeness that involves a certain 
confusion of voices. Mimesis occurs when the voice of the poet and the voices of 
the poetic characters become confused, when the poet does not speak of herself 
but rather speaks of someone else in the voice of someone else.  When the poet 
speaks in the voice of someone else, then her own voice is permeated or invaded 
by the voice of the other, this intrusive agent of mimesis that takes over and 
annihilates the “I” as the ego of the poet. The poet is self-subtracted and dissolved 
and what emerges from the lack of the poet is an anarchic crowd of characters. So, 
mimesis has to do with a becoming absent of the poet that is caused by direct 
speech; a certain obscuring, hiding, and disappearance, even lack, of the poet: “If 
the poet nowhere hid himself, his poetic work and narrative as a whole would have 
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taken place without imitation” (Republic, 393c). Imitation is a cryptic gesture, 
Socrates/Plato contends; what is disconcerting about it is its veiling operation: 
mimesis involves a certain hiding of the authorial voice, ensuing the improper 
closeness in the relationship between the authorial ego and the others. Claudia 
Barrachi has put it incisively: “As the poet recedes and disappears toward the 
background, those he sings of acquire their own voice, as it were, and seem in fact 
to sing themselves, of their own accord. Yet the clarity of this way of poetic 
elocution enfolds an obscuring moment (Baracchi 100).” Plato/Socrates wants to 
rescue the poetic elocution from the “obscuring moment” of suspended clarity as 
well as the authorial subjectivity from the cryptic intersubjectivity of the narrative 
(the confusion of voices in direct speech) that accounts for the disruptive 
disappearance, absence of the authorial “I”, as he wants to rescue his ideal city 
from the disruptive occurrence of heterogeneity, disorder, and alterity. Plato’s 
mimetology conveys an anxiety lest the author’s voice should be distilled by the 
infusion of other voices—or, voices of the other(s)—construed as invading 
outsiders, signifiers of inappropriate immediacy (direct speech), and 
phantasmatic agents of an evocation yet to come or an evocation that calls the 
Politeia’s yet-to-come in question.    
 Such are the limits (and limitations) of imitative narration: one can speak 
of the other as long as she does not speak like, or speak as, the other, as long as 
she does not become the other, as long as she is not carried away by the other. 
Inherent in this stipulation is a certain anxiety over the danger of the inhuman: 
the sweeping ontology of the “other” that accounts for the detriment of the 
mimetic does not merely encompass human voices and/as poetic characters, but 
also extends dangerously to a whole archive of forces of nature, animality, musical 
instruments, and passions—all presumed symptoms of an impure, contaminated 
humanity. At the same time, these symptoms of nonhumanness and fluctuating 
humanity operate as “tropes” that, as the word’s etymology suggests, in taking 
turns at invoking the malleable limits of humanity, they turn and they shift the 
very notion of the human10  Plato’s concept of mimesis, as defined in relation to 
poetry, does connote the poetic and performative turns of tropē and strophē; it 
also entails the cata-strophe signaled by a certain intimacy with the non-human:  
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The more he [imitator/poet] will narrate everything and think nothing unworthy 
of himself; hence he’ll undertake seriously to imitate in the presence of many 
everything we were just mentioning—thunder, the noises of winds, hailstorms, 
axles and pulleys, the voices of trumpets, flutes, and all the instruments, and even 
the sound of dogs, sheep, and birds.  And this man’s whole style will be based on 
imitation of voice and looks, or else include only a bit of narrative. (Republic 397a-
b) 
 
As the human is fixed in Socrates/Plato, a pre-existing integral part of the 
universal moral economy of truth, what renders the powerful force of mimesis 
pernicious to the ideal state is its capacity to suggest possibilities of the immoral 
by condensing and recapitulating the ghostly danger of slippage into the dystopic 
“others” of eventuality and temporality. The blurring of boundaries between the 
authorial subject and its objects—whether human or inhuman-, at once a blurring 
of boundaries between human and inhuman, threatens the moral integrity, 
stability, and political harmony of the Republic.  Mimesis is, inter alia, about the 
eruption of difference at the heart of humanness going astray.    
 But what Socrates -“the one who does not write,” as Nietzsche puts it—
further claims is that this losing of one’s self into the voices of characters may not 
be avoidable.    However, it is the readiness to indifferently lose oneself, to 
withdraw and disappear for the sake of the characters’ emergence that he finds 
problematic. While imitation may not be avoidable, however, it is nevertheless 
imperative for an ordered polis (quintessence of the properly human) to put 
constraints on it.  In other words, given a certain ineluctability of mimesis, one 
should be very cautious not to give it a preeminent role in one’s discourse; one 
should always be alert to limit and harness the desire to imitate as much as 
possible.  
Plato is not suspicious of mimesis per se, it ought to be kept in mind, but 
rather of a particular aspect of mimesis: one that I would call “the contingency of 
surprise.” Mimesis potentially destabilizes the relation between signifier and 
signified, it blurs the distinction between “true” and “false” representations, and 
it threatens to install falsehood in the realm of the real. This “graft” of otherness 
in the body of sameness potentially de-essentializes the universal stability of 
truth. In potentially de-instituting the representational order of truth, it 
potentially jeopardizes the order of the polis. Platonic mimesis is cast as a spectral 
and enigmatic strategy of de-familiarization, potentially threatening to the 
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epistemic and political structures of intelligibility. Plato was right in his 
assessment of the pernicious reality-effects of mimesis, i.e., the eruption of the 
subversive potential inherent in mimesis. What Plato wanted to discipline was 
precisely the ghostly superfluity of this impetus: the impetus of initiating new 
modes of sensing and knowing, the impetus of becoming otherwise and beyond 
the predictability of truth.  Mimesis, then, ought to be either safely interwoven in 
the ordinary fabric of the intelligibility of the polis and its sovereign episteme, or 
condemned to exile.   
  The expulsion of the poet from the ideal city is not indiscriminate, but 
rather selective.  The moral force of the Republic entails a re-formation and 
rehabilitation of poietic activity so as to bring the mimetic element under a certain 
control. What is pernicious about mimetic poetry is precisely the seductive power 
that it can exert over the (individual) soul; it is by virtue of this compelling force 
to affect, to “lay hold of the soul,” that it is considered to be menacing to the moral 
order of the city. Mimetic art depicts and enhances passion, pain, and sexual 
desires, which ought to be harnessed. Plato/Socrates is especially concerned with 
the performed “aesthetic” quality of mimesis (the poietic [poiein] and the 
aesthetic [aisthesis] are conjoined qualities of poetry in P/S), as is exemplified in 
the case of music: “Isn’t this why the rearing in music is most sovereign? Because 
rhythm and harmony most of all insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the 
soul and most vigorously lay hold of it in bringing grace with them; and they make 
a man graceful if he is correctly reared, if not, the opposite.  (Republic 401d-e).   
While Socrates/Plato was forced (that is, ethically compelled) to banish certain 
genres of performed mimetic poetry, even against himself (that is, against his own 
poietic self), nonetheless he recognized the inspired and inspiring force implicit 
in poetry (theios fovos, “divine terror”).  Such is the radical ambivalence inherent 
in the logic of the Politeia: Plato/Socrates’ simultaneous acknowledgement of the 
power –and intractability- of mimetic poetry is coterminous with his impulse to 
subject it to a system of rules and propriety, a system of state power for which the 
capture of the soul is reserved. Indeed, the joyful wisdom of mimesis does not 
belong to the austere and univocal body of the Republic: 
 
Now, as it seems, if a man who is able by wisdom to become every sort of thing 
and to imitate all things should come to our city, wishing to make a display of 
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himself and his poems, we would fall on our knees before him as a man sacred, 
wonderful, and pleasing; but we would say that there is no such man among us in 
the city, nor is it lawful for such a man to be born there. We would send him to 
another city, with myrrh poured over his head and crowned with wool, while we 
ourselves would use a more austere and less pleasing poet and teller of tales for 
the sake of benefit, one who would imitate the style of the decent man and would 
say what he says in those models that we set down as laws at the beginning, when 
we undertook to educate the soldiers.  (398a-b) 
 
So, a fundamental power and a fundamental risk are conjoined and co-
implicit in the poietic activity. Poetry is considered dangerous for society and its 
fixity to the extent that it initiates and propels becomings and shiftings: the 
capability of assuming different shapes (“to become every sort of thing”), in other 
words, to pro-duce into presence, is detrimental to the fixed intelligibility of 
presence. (The mimesis that Plato dismisses, we should note, is not a repetition of 
the Same. It is, rather, a bringing-forth of the ever-shifting continuities and 
discontinuities between the so-called “original” and the so-called “copy,” between 
identity and difference; the production of the simulacrum is haunted by the 
incalculable forces of alterity.) What Socrates/Plato dreams of is an original 
without copy, without other; an essential, indivisible, and self-present physis 
indistinguishable from and uncontaminated by the allo-presence of the substitute 
that commemorates the Same’s difference from itself. Socrates/Plato’s concern is 
about mimesis’s capacity not merely to repeat, but rather to supplement and 
supplant. In his text, Dissemination, Jacques Derrida has importantly drawn our 
attention to the supplementary qualities of mimesis that destabilize the 
conventional hierarchies between origin and copy. What threatens and upsets the 
being of the Politeia from within is a particular aspect of mimetic “bringing into 
being” (poiein), namely, the implication of mimesis that the so-called original can 
be doubled, imitated, appropriated, repeated, replaced, and alienated. Such 
reproducibility, implying non-proximity with the origin, calls into question the 
fixity of the authentic status of the origin itself qua anchor of the true. It is this 
spatial and temporal movement, this différance (the conjoined movements of 
difference and deferral that—in the Derridean universe—constitute the condition 
for transcending the ontological distinction between identity and difference) as 
the essential undecidability, indiscernibility, ambiguity, and confusion between 
“origin” and “copy,” imitated and imitator, referent and sign, signified and 
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signifier, as well as between intimate and alien, and city and nature, that poses the 
problem, and thus the inalienable singularity that the Republic wants to establish 
has a high stake in mastering. This is where Nietzsche’s critique of Western 
metaphysics lies: he seeks to liberate the signifier from the authorized, 
authoritative, and authoritarian logic of logos and truth. What seems to be at play 
as he parodies dialectical opposition and ontological difference and suggests the 
forces of play, laughter, and dance is a certain self-othering of truth. Let me 
mention in passing that dance’s position (or, rather, step), always different and 
deferred, is particularly significant among Nietzsche’s nondialectical and 
heterogeneous forces of “demolition.”   
  The Platonic disqualification, condemnation, and banishing of the 
mimetic arts are not (or, are not merely) gestures of prohibition and expulsion, 
but rather self-inaugurating (maieutic) gestures of an authoritative drive to 
constitute the boundaries between the propriety/properness and 
impropriety/improperness of poetic genres and modes. As an antidote to the 
maleficent mimesis, Plato/Socrates maintains the necessity to oversee and 
discipline the (magical, thaumaturgical [Republic, 602c-d]) power of mimesis 
(that is, to master the difference that mimesis plays out), to administer the technē 
of eidōlon, to strip the act/art of living of any trace of unplannedness, 
unpreparedness, unforeseeability, eventuality, playfulness, openendedness, and 
surprise –all (supplementary) attributes by virtue of which poetry becomes 
pleasing, seductive, and thus disruptive and dangerous. The ethical and aesthetic 
order of the polis is always in need of vigilance against the impulse to Other. 
Taming the ineffable power of the mimetic arts and their polysemy is submitted 
as the ultimate antidote to the perpetual danger—in fact, structural possibility—
that the overpowering shadowy multitude of authorial “others” represents; a 
phenomenality par excellence that, by virtue of its errant and proliferating 
iterability, lies beyond the controlling bounds of the author, construed as the 
signifier of essence and conveyer of truth. The antidote seems to be in 
Socrates/Plato’s eyes the didactic suppression, ostracization, of the pleasing 
excess, the residue of the uncontrolled movement of mimeisthai, by the sovereign 
ethico-juridical full self-presence of the authorial “I.”  
But is there such thing as a pure poietic topos of single authorial voice, 
immune from the shadows and specters of encrypted voices? Is there any way, for 
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instance, to capture an authentic Socrates—the nonwriter- from the devoted 
Plato—the mimetic writer? What is so daunting about the mimetic effects of 
undecidability and ambiguity between imitated and imitator, between “original” 
and “imitation,” between referent and sign? Why is transparent and fixed self-
identification so momentously important to the ethico-political order and 
stability? What is it about eidōlon (appearance, apparition, shadow) that infuses 
eidos (the “shape”—figure or, in etymological affinity with that, fiction [< 
fingere]—which endows presence with intelligibility) with the force to provoke so 
much anxiety and, furthermore, propels programmatic measures of surveillance, 
protection, demarcation, and exclusion by the custodians of the ideal state? What 
stakes does the ordered presence of the ethico-political system have in 
safeguarding the unambiguous intelligibility of the eidos from its phantoms and 
apparitions, re-presentations and de-presentations?  
 
Aesthetic transformation in the eternal return of the Same 
Here again, to such questions Nietzsche responds otherwise. The experience of art 
encompasses the self-reflexive movement of turning ourselves into an aesthetic 
phenomenon. This “turning” entails a certain way of seeing differently, a seeing 
differently that not only does not leave the self outside, but rather renders it the 
principal destination of the strophē necessarily involved in the aesthetic 
experience. Although art in Nietzsche’s thought starts less from aisthesis than 
from the “devaluation of all values,” art is an embodied experience in Nietzsche, 
an experience that involves the aisthesis (meaning sensation or perception by the 
senses) of eyes, hands, hearing, etc., as an organic component of wisdom.11 The 
“aesthetic” experience (the quotation marks imply that it is not entirely accurate 
to attribute the concept of “aesthetics” to Nietzsche 12) is a performative force in 
that it suspends and interrupts momentarily the way we live our lives. It distances 
us from ourselves, and, as a result, we manage to see ourselves as an aesthetic 
phenomenon (note, here, that the self, typically construed as einai [“being”], turns 
into phainesthai [“phenomenon”]). Far from being a describable and prescribable 
static “thing,” the self is always already open to the ec-static performative 
eventualities brought forth by the strophic effects of the aesthetic experience. The 
human is susceptible to the tropological functioning of art as action, susceptible 
to the tropologies of becoming, always to become, always in motion (hence the 
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Nietzschean trope of dancing). Nietzsche invites us to “stand above morality,” to 
“look upon ourselves,” and to “look down upon ourselves.” So, unlike in 
Plato/Socrates’ one-way pro-ductive poetics, such strophē is a welcome and 
necessary move in Nietzsche: pure potentiality of distancing, negating, and 
annihilating. Unlike the rather austerely and hierarchically structured topography 
of the Republic, the Nietzschean topography is a topography “under erasure,” a 
topography of perpetual turning, distancing, seeing differently, and spacing the 
self:     
 
As an aesthetic phenomenon existence is still bearable for us, and art furnishes us 
with eyes and hands and above all the good conscience to be able to turn ourselves 
into such a phenomenon. At times we need a rest from ourselves by looking upon, 
by looking down upon, ourselves and, from an artistic distance, laughing over 
ourselves or weeping over ourselves. We must discover the hero no less than the 
fool in our passion for knowledge; we must occasionally find pleasure in our folly, 
or we cannot continue to find pleasure in our wisdom. Precisely because we are at 
bottom grave and serious human beings—really, more weights than human 
beings—nothing does us as much good as a fool’s cap: we need it in relation to 
ourselves—we need all exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish, and 
blissful art lest we lose the freedom above things that our ideal demands of us. It 
would mean a relapse for us, with our irritable honesty, to get involved entirely in 
morality and, for the sake of the over-severe demands that we make on ourselves 
in these matters, to become virtuous monsters and scarecrows. We should be able 
also to stand above morality—and not only to stand with the anxious stiffness of 
a man who is afraid of sleeping and falling any moment, but also to float above it 
and play. How then could we possibly dispense with art—and with the fool?—And 
as long as you are in any way ashamed before yourselves, you do not yet belong 
with us. (The Gay Science 163-164) 
  
Such distancing vis-à-vis the artistic event, a distancing which amounts to a 
distancing from the universal, eternal, and absolute (ethical) context in which the 
experience of art takes place, is not presented programmatically as necessarily 
emancipatory, a definite or permanent response to the rigidities of onerous 
morality. It is, rather, a temporary interruption or suspension of the morality that 
saturates our lives, “a rest from ourselves” (selves, which are “at bottom grave and 
serious human beings” in Nietzsche’s anti-idealism). If the drive for demarcation 
that permeates the logic of the Republic aims at establishing the moral standards 
of proper poetry—i.e., the authority of seriousness and the alētheia of presence—
, Nietzsche’s Joyful Wisdom seeks for ephemeral moments of rest from the 
properness of the world of truth and the over-severe demands of morality.13  
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Such rest is by no means unequivocally passive, however. In Nietzsche, art 
is conceived of as experience (ex-per-ientia and em-peiría), a concept 
etymologically interrelated with praxis: a concept, which, in turn, suggests peras 
(limit) and poros (passage). The Nietzschean experience of art encompasses the 
praxic contemporaneous duality of both acknowledging-a-certain-limit and 
crossing-over. We should be capable of this willed experience, insists Nietzsche. 
We should be able to stand outside of our moralized selves by effecting acts of 
falling, relapsing, floating, dancing, and playing, by distancing and othering 
ourselves, by demystifying the ideals of morality, by employing the dis-identifying 
forces of the aesthetic experience.  
We should be able not to be afraid of falling from morality (perhaps that is 
the only occasion of gravity that Nietzsche subscribes to); we should be able to 
float and dance unashamedly above it, “from an artistic distance” (164), “beyond 
good and evil.” Nietzsche conceptualizes this temporary exteriority (“above,” 
“outside,” and “beyond”) as an exteriority vis-à-vis the bounds of what has 
constituted us as selves, the human spirit itself, the text of its naturalness.  It is in 
that sense that, according to Nietzsche, it is the “beautiful unnaturalness” of the 
“passion that sings” (Nietzsche, The Gay Science, p. 134) that accounts for the 
popularity of opera. After all, we all need a rest from the strenuous sublimity of 
the whole (text plus music) melody:  
 
Confronted with the characters in an opera, we are not supposed to take their word 
for it, but the sound! That is the difference, that is the beautiful unnaturalness for 
whose sake one goes to the opera. Even the recitativo secco really is not meant to 
be heard as words and text: this kind of half-music is only supposed, first, to give 
the musical ear a little rest (rest from the melody as the most sublime but therefore 
also most strenuous enjoyment of this art) and then very soon also something else: 
namely, a growing impatience, a growing irritation, a new desire for whole music, 
for melodies.  (ibid, p. 135)     
 
The joyous spirit of a passionate philosophy that sings. A playful suspension of the 
sublime wholeness and certainty that spawns—via perpetual revaluation—the 
restless desire for a renewed version of it. It is this self-determined desire 
emerging freely from the temporary suspension of gravity that guarantees the 
keeping of the promise of harmony. Ecstatic weightlessness, then, is presented as 
an antidote to the doctrinal discipline and rigorous seriousness of humanness 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 23/08/2021 05:30:36 |
 





Synthesis 13 (2020) 
 
194 
(“really, more weights than human beings,” ibid, p. 164). “Light feet” as an 
antidote to the unbearable gravity of Science. He writes in The Gay Science:  
 
One could conceive of such a pleasure and power of self-determination, such a 
freedom of the will that the spirit would take leave of all faith and every wish for 
certainty, being practiced in maintaining himself on insubstantial ropes and 
possibilities and dancing even near abysses. Such a spirit would be the free spirit 
par excellence. (289-90, original emphasis)           
 
Such playful distancing is not an escape from oneself, only a different kind of 
addressing oneself through a collusion between joining and separation. We do not 
use the bliss of art to escape our lives, but to run back to our lives, equipped with 
a different way of being ourselves, in ourselves, and with ourselves, a way of being-
in-becoming. The very concept of the subject (hypo-keimenon) is inextricably tied 
to the risk of its own self-dissolution as a kind of substratum, the risk of a self-
formation effected through the techne of a continual—albeit ephemeral—loss, a 
temporary suspension of serious selfhood and breakdown of rigorous identity. 
The distancing of joyful wisdom does not contradict the elimination of distance: 
the subject—that is, the subject of art, who coincides with the figure of the 
overman—is momentarily captured by the forces of joyousness, in what seems to 
be a prelude to the inevitable re-call. Nietzsche presents us with the openness of 
the self to the forces of becoming. This recurrence of open-endedness (pragmatic 
rather than mystical) consists in a particular inevitable mode of becoming human 
that is affirmed through the overcoming of the human14; an eternal shifting of the 
limits of the human towards the forces of life, whereby these forces take hold of 
the Nietzschean subject. (For Plato/Socrates, let us be reminded, this shift and 
confusion of limits is something to be reckoned with; the characters and their 
voices should be kept in check by the authorial subjectivity.) Nietzsche’s 
distancing does not allude to a definitive moment of radical emancipation from 
the originary “home” of sovereign morality and truth, but rather an eternal 
nomadic and overflowing counterforce, a heterogeneous movement that involves 
dancing even near the abyss of self-dissolution.  
 We would certainly see the desire to mime as included in these Nietzschean 
acts of rest from properness. Nietzsche’s “free spirit” of art enters “into every 
skin, into every emotion”. On the Dionysian aesthetic intoxication as mimesis, 
Nietzsche writes:  
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In the Dionysian state, on the other hand, the entire emotional system is altered 
and intensified: so that it discharges all its powers of representation, imitation, 
transfiguration, transmutation, every kind of mimicry and playacting conjointly.  
The essential thing remains the facility of the metamorphosis, the incapacity not 
to react (-in a similar way to certain types of hysteric, who also assume any role at 
the slightest instigation).  It is impossible for the Dionysian man not to understand 
any suggestion of whatever kind, he ignores no signal from the emotions, he 
possesses to the highest degree the instinct for understanding and divining, just 
as he possesses the art of communication to the highest degree.  He enters into 
every skin, into every emotion; he is continually transforming himself.  (Twilight 
of the Idols, 84, original emphasis).   
 
In the emotional realm of art, Nietzscean subjecthood involves a certain 
expropriating, or displacing of the authorial voice—the author of one’s own life—
ensuing the improper closeness in the relationship between the authorial ego and 
the others; it confuses the boundaries between the authorial subject—in the 
metaphysics of subject, the self is self-identical- and its (imitated) objects. Beyond 
the pure bounds of the authorial subject who in the western metaphysics of 
representation has been the signifier of essence and conveyer of truth, mimesis 
may provoke the unintended, unexpected slippage of the self into the dystopic 
“others” of eventuality, temporality and potentiality. Coalescing with “what is 
alien,” the individual becomes, as Nietzsche remarks, both “Dionysus and the 
Crucified”: s(h)e learns “to recognize [herself] not in- and [for-herself] but as the 
fortuitous case, as just like everyone else (perhaps as all the names in history). 
This would amount to the individual recognizing itself solely as the event …” 
Pearson 126). In other words, there is no pure originality of the subject and there 
is no subject prior to mimesis. The mimicking art subject also “possesses the art 
of communication to the highest degree”. If s(h)e communicates art and art is 
communicated then an intensified affect that could trigger others in acts of self-
transformations, is also communicated. In Nietzsche, mimesis is about the 
eventness of self-displacement; it is on this point of deferring and displacing self-
significance that one should turn to the problematic of the “other” and the larger 
problem of the self/other binary.  Linking art, mimesis and subjectivity, I consider 
mimesis via Nietzsche as a self-altering mode of authorship, enactment and 
performative and I invite critical consideration of the ethics and effects of mimesis 
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as a self-action, a performativity of selfhood, or as a “technology of the self” in the 
Foucauldian sense.  
How can one be open to acts of displacement and disarticulation, to occur 
from within the horizon of the existing world?  “How, then, can one set oneself up 
to be surprised by otherness?,” Barbara Johnson asks. In her words: 
  
The surprise of otherness is that moment when a new form of ignorance is 
suddenly activated as an imperative. If the deconstructive impulse is to retain its 
vital, subversive power, we must therefore become ignorant of it again and again. 
It is only by forgetting what we know how to do, by setting aside the thoughts that 
have most changed us, that those thoughts and that knowledge can go on making 
accessible to us the surprise of an otherness we can only encounter in the moment 
of suddenly discovering we are ignorant of it.  (16) 
 
Her suggestion of the activation of a deconstructive ignorance of “what we know 
how to do” resonates with Nietzsche’s call for actively forgetting what has most 
dynamically formed one’s own life. For Nietzsche, historical sensibility “injures 
and ultimately destroys all living things, whether a human being, a people, or a 
culture”:  
All action requires forgetting, just as the existence of all organic beings requires 
forgetting, just as the existence of all organic things requires not only light, but 
darkness as well. A human being who wanted to experience things in a thoroughly 
historical manner would be like someone forced to go without sleep, or like an 
animal supposed to exist solely by rumination and ever repeated rumination. In 
other words, it is possible to live almost without memory, indeed, to live happily, 
as the animals show us; but without forgetting, it is utterly impossible to live at 
all.  Or, to express my theme even more simply: There is a degree of sleeplessness, 
of rumination, of historical sensibility, that injures and ultimately destroys all 
living things, whether a human being, a people, or a culture.” (Nietzsche, “On the 
Utility and Liability of History for Life” 89, original emphasis.)   
 
I would like to turn to Denise Ferreira da Silva, at this point, in order to read into 
Nietzsche’s dismissal of the historical, a political gesture opening to a 
transgressive future not programmed by the normative present. In her book 
Towards a global idea of race, Ferreira da Silva identifies temporality and 
interiority with white and Eurocentric subjectivity, and spatiality and exteriority 
with racialized subjectivity. In the history of western philosophy, the modern 
white Eurocentric subject is self-sufficient, self-determined, rational, universal, 
idealized and human, whereas the racialized subject is affectable, outer-
determined, corporeal, particular, negated and merely—or, less than- human. In 
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an unmediated manner, the universal subject is able to intuitively conceive of 
abstractions and achieve a space of knowledge and freedom in a temporal process 
of progressive continuity. Outside of universality, history, and transcendentality, 
the racialized subject is always already mediated by the body, by others, by spatial 
belongings according to power dynamics that introduce geographical hierarchies 
and differentiation. In this interpellation of the non-white as pathologized, the 
philosopher reclaims corporeality and spatiality as a pluralistic political space of 
“contemporaneous, coexisting, and contending” embodied relations among all 
(Ferreira da Silva, Toward a Global Idea of Race 106). She points to an 
intersectional poetics along the analytics of race and gender with the ethical 
mandate to emancipate the category of Blackness from the registers of the other, 
the object, and the commodity. Her black feminist “poethics” is a moment of 
radical praxis acknowledging the creative capacity that blackness indexes, and 
demanding decolonization—that is, a reconstruction of the world opening up new 
ways of knowing, doing, and existing (Ferreira da Silva, “Toward a Black Feminist 
Poethics 112). Nietzsche’s aesthetics as a rest from moral, epistemological and 
historical properness is radicalized by Ferreira da Silva’s black feminist poethics. 
  
The critical ironies of poiesis and praxis 
To read Socrates/Plato’s and Nietzsche’s treatment of the problem of art in 
parallel is to venture to read metaphysics of presence and metaphysics of the will 
in parallel; to trace the trajectory from locating the problem of art in the realm of 
poiesis to locating the problem of art in the realm of praxis. The Platonic-Socratic 
poiesis (poiein, to pro-duce, to bring into being, into existence—as Plato explains 
in the Symposium) signals the linear effecting of the passage from nonbeing to 
being, from absence to presence, from obscurity to unveiling, from latency to view, 
revealing -opening spaces of- a-letheia (a+ lēthē, forgetfulness, oblivion); in other 
words, the Platonic poiesis is a mode of truth, which is the peras, the limit of pro-
duction. While, by contrast, the Nietzschean praxis alludes to the practical and 
voluntary creative desire, willful drive, and impulse, in other words, the 
experience whereby the will—will to power—expresses itself in an act of art rather 
than truth: “art is worth more than truth” (Will to Power 453 n. 853). The 
Nietzschean praxis, in other words, is not pro-ductive, in the sense that it has no 
peras—it is limitless and aimless—and brings forth nothing external to itself: “The 
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world as a work of art that gives birth to itself” (ibid, 225 n. 419);  it is a configuration 
of the circle of the eternal recurrence. 15  
 And yet, the two critical discursive renderings on art that I proposed here 
to read together (that is, the one as supplementary to the other, especially at their 
limits, or the one as the limit of the other) belong together in some way or another.  
They both invoke one of the most fundamental themes of Western metaphysics, 
namely, the acknowledgement of the very predicamets of its own “truth” and the 
attendant impulse to generate discourses that point beyond it.  In doing so, they 
both thematize the very limit which comes to bespeak the limit of their own 
discourse. The Republic’s discourse that cautions against the over-exposure to the 
abysmal effects of mimesis, its uncanny spell and enjoyment, is essentially 
mimetic. The truth that the text purports to present—concerning the essence of 
poiesis as pro-duction into presence, and the principal mimetic effect as falling 
away from the truth of the single and original presence- remains errant and 
indeterminate in the undecidable dialogic play between writing and nonwriting. 
Plato and Socrates perform thus the very transgression that constitutes the limit 
of their own ideal and their own discourse.16  In Nietzsche’s universe in turn, the 
indetermination of the self-disrupting distancing from the Same, the promise of 
the devaluation of actuality and origination, has its own limits and limitations; 
reaching into the abyss is ensued by the regressive moment of rebounding back to 
Sameness. The blissful moment of suspending, negating, and annihilating the 
properness of universal truth, the moment of voluntarily falling from sovereign 
morality and dancing the dance of creative self-generation (the joyous moment of 
art and becoming), comes inevitably to a closure. This closure designates a 
reinvigorated impulse to return; return to the universal circle of the eternal 
recurrence of the Same (the world of truth and being). This is a will to power in its 
“weakness or repentance or resignation or hardening or gloom” (Nietzsche, The 
Gay Science 2). Will to power and an all-too-human eternal recurrence belong to 
one another in a way that echoes the anxious and ambivalent ways in which the 
Platonic-Socratic mimesis and alterity belong to one another.  
Plato’s mimesis and Nietzsche’s eternal return are in suspension between 
being implicated in the ethical convention and yet undermining the operations of 
authorial and authoritative conventionality. They are in a suspension between the 
return of the Same and the production of the event. The connections between the 
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identification, affiliation, and the power contexts within mimesis as a form of 
repetition occurs, is the perception that this spectral bodying-forth of eventness is 
not a question of overcoming the limits and the logic of the proper but rather of 
ironically miming/repeating intelligibility in ways that allow for acts of disruptive 
inscription to occur. What is of crucial importance is the eventness that emerges 
from the (im)possibilities of mimetic incorporations. Employing a 
performative/citational account of mimetic signification informed by Judith 
Butler’s theorization of gender performativity and Jacques Derrida’s theorization 
of citationality, I think the relation between materiality and intelligibility beyond 
causality, beyond transitivity, and beyond the teleological conception of matter in 
Plato.17 The imitating is not a purely and simply representation for the imitated, a 
solely objective (accurate or less accurate) replica. Instead the copy, in its 
repetitions and reproductions of the original, may lose its origin. It has the 
potential to re-form, subvert, and transcend the authoritative premises of the 
original. The original in its turn is imperfect, malleable, and tenuous to such 
transformation; as a matrix of ideality or idealized power, the original is 
susceptible to the instabilities and contingencies of materialization. Repetition 
and difference are unavoidably implicated in a disquieting site of contestation. 
Repetition then is an incalculably dynamic and differential processes of 
materialization in the sense of susceptibility to the spectral—a vital and precarious 
eventuality, which does not originate, and which never fully materializes. 18 What 
is at stake, then, is a consideration of the propriety and property of mimetic 
iterability itself: the possibilities (for subversion) and also the perils (of 
renormalization) it entails. The question (to be sure, not in the sense of question 
that waits to be resolved but rather of aporia that enables as much as complicates 
the possibility of our reflections over and over again) is this: What would it take 
to radicalize citationality so as to dis-place it or even re-invent it beyond (the 
proper place of) its discursive limits, beyond its sociosymbolic premises of 
penetration and containment, and beyond the semantic horizon of the existing 
intelligible itself—given that “horizon” figures a certain finality of what is possible 
(the word ορίζων signals the όριο, limit).  
How, then, might this destabilization in epistemologies of fixed origins and 
authentic presences, as put forward by the doubling structure of mimesis and its 
implications of representation and identification, gesture toward the 
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potentialities of art’s criticality? Rather than a semblance of the present, the 
mimetic element of art’s criticality encompasses the contradictory impulse 
towards rearticulating the unfulfilled and the unrealized. I tried here to prompt 
anew the question of art’s critical performativity, especially in its mutual affective 
entanglement of the literary and the philosophical, as a means of contesting 
predicaments of power and reconfiguring (instead of representing) the world. 
Critique, instead of criticism, involves rethinking (as well as relearning and 
unlearning) the underlying limitations, assumptions, and truth claims that 
determine what can be thought, sensed, known, acknowledged. Embedded in a 
present marked by states of continuous crisis, criticality allows us to critically 
think (with) past and present injustices as well as unrealized, disavowed 
transformative possibilities ensconced in the established power-knowledge 
structures. Addressing art as critique and criticality becomes a performative 
resource that allows us to reclaim and re-embody the never-ending task of 
imagining the present and the future. It might allow us to think with the limits 
and possibilities entailed in this task.  
 
 
1 On how thinking through, with and after the global in the present might allow us to 
decenter and displace the dominant ways of being differentially tangled up in the world, 
see Athanasiou. 
2 As Butler convincingly argues: 
 
Is that temporary identification that I perform, the one that raises the question of 
whether I am involved in a parody of these positions, not precisely a moment in 
which, for better or worse, they become my position? It is, I would argue, 
impossible to perform a convincing parody of an intellectual position without 
having a prior affiliation with what one parodies, without having and wanting an 
intimacy with the position one takes in or on as the object of parody.  Parody 
requires a certain ability to identify, approximate, and draw near; it engages an 
intimacy with the position it appropriates that troubles the voice, the bearing, the 
performativity of the subject such that the audience or the reader does not quite 
know where it is you stand, whether you have gone over to the other side, whether 
you remain on your side, whether you can rehearse that other position without 
falling prey to it in the midst of the performance” (266) 
3 In my essay “Metaphysical topographies re-layered: Critique and the feminine, I attend 
to the particular ways in which Luce Irigaray, philosopher, psychoanalyst and theoretician 
of sexual difference appropriates and stages in her own idiom what she recites from Plato 
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and Nietzche. She reads them by breaking the boundaries between authoring, reading, and 
re-writing and exposes the limits of the texts she writes on by exposing and reworking their 
underlying heteronomic forces. Τhrough miming and reiterating the textual strategies and 
gestures of the philosophical text she comments on, she seeks to call into question and 
transgress the terms by which the hierarchical ontological binary of origination/generation 
is posited by/in the Platonic text. As she critically appropriates the Platonic and Nietzshean 
text, she reads in them the constitutive erasure of the feminine (Luce Irigaray, Speculum 
of the Other Woman and Marine Lover of Friedrich Nietzsche). Gayatri Chakravorty 
Spivak could have had Irigaray’s work in mind when she wrote: “In the long run, the most 
useful thing that a training in French feminism can give us is politicized and critical 
examples of ‘symptomatic reading’” (154-184).  
4 This Platonic idea of the good beyond being is of profound interest to Emmanuel Levinas 
and his endeavor to think alterity by starting from the Other rather than the totality of the 
Same (Time and the Other). The attempt to think difference beyond being is linked, in 
Levinas’ “ethics of the other,” with the overcoming of the Eleatic notion of being (i.e. 
Parmenides).  In Otherwise than Being, Levinas rethinks and problematizes the 
formulation of “going beyond,” by elaborating on his notion of proximity.  Luce Irigaray is 
clearly influenced by Levinas’ thought, especially by his theorizing of ethics and his attempt 
to insubordinate otherness from the logic of sameness.   
5 The utopic, by its inception, is a force field of the imaginary. In Plato’s account of ideal 
political commonwealth, the utopic is fundamentally fantasized as a self-contained place, 
a topos of a perfectly regulated and controlled society.  Utopia is, in other words, a fantasy 
of perfect and absolute control, which can only be attained through the subordination of 
the possibility of the “event” -in the Foucauldian sense- the possibility of the eruption of 
the truly novel, the unheard-of, the unimagined.  It is not accidental that “utopia” is 
etymologically and conceptually linked with a logic of spatiality rather than a dynamic of 
temporality.  As Elizabeth Grosz so aptly put it:  
 
the utopic is always conceived as a space, usually an enclosed and isolated space 
–the walled city, the isolated island, a political and agrarian self-contained 
organization, and thus a commonwealth.…The utopic is definitionally conceived 
in the topological mode, as a place with definite contours and features. … It is 
significant that the question of the future in and of the Republic, the future of the 
Utopians, remains unaddressed; utopia, like the dialectic itself, is commonly 
fantasized as the end of time, the end of history, the moment of resolution of past 
problems. The utopic organization is conceived as a machine capable of solving 
foreseeable problems through the perfection of its present techniques.  This is the 
image of an ideal society in which time stops and, as Plato recognized, the timeless 
sets it. …  The utopian mode seeks a future that itself has no future, a future in 
which time will cease to be a relevant factor, and movement, change, and 
becoming remain impossible.” (135-142)       
6 A disclaimer and note of clarification is in order here. The point is not to dismiss the 
Platonic text for not “including” women, but rather to expose and discuss the sexual 
indifference –to borrow Luce Irigaray’s terminology- that has overwhelmingly marked the 
Western philosophical history, since at least the time of Plato. When Irigaray and other 
feminist philosophers set out to reread the history of philosophy, they pose the question of 
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sexual difference as a question that has not been adequately raised within Western 
metaphysics. It is not, in other words, that the feminine is “absent” from the “egalitarian” 
political organization of the Republic (in Book V, for instance, Plato expounds on the ideal 
arrangements between the sexes and the inclusion of women in the education to the 
guardian class), or other Platonic texts for that matter, but rather that the feminine “is 
there” to work as the constitutive excluded condition of the phallogocentric discourse of 
metaphysics, the constitutive outside of its economy and intelligibility. As Judith Butler has 
put it, “when those specular (and spectral) feminine figures are taken to be the feminine, 
the feminine is fully erased by its very representation. The economy that claims to include 
the feminine as the subordinate term in a binary opposition of masculine/feminine 
excludes the feminine, produces the feminine as that which must be excluded for that 
economy to operate.”  (Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 
“Sex,” 1993, p. 36). Such is the aporia of the thematization and figuration of the feminine 
within the textual body of Western metaphysics: The feminine cannot adequately 
thematized or figured in the Platonic text, precisely because it is the very excess that renders 
the conditions of the text possible, it is what eludes figuration, even if “it is there,” 
represented as a poor copy, a shadow, a reflection, a derivative complementary to the self-
presence of Truth. In the economy of representation of metaphysics, the feminine is 
represented as the unrepresentable condition of representation.  Consequently, the 
feminist critique articulated by Irigaray and others is by no means organized by a pursuit 
to “enter” this economy.  What is at issue, in other words, is not “equality” between the 
sexes, but rather the exclusionary rules and presuppositions that govern the logic of that 
discourse.   
7 Martin Heidegger notes that Plato’s conceptualization of art as a whole is associated with 
the conjunction of the notions of poein -to bring forth- and poiesis -poetry.  On Plato’s 
identification of art with poetry, he writes:  
 
Finally, if by “art” we mean what is brought forward in a process of bringing-forth, 
what is produced in production, and the producing itself, then the Greek [Plato] 
speaks of poiein and poiēsis. That the world poiēsis in the emphatic sense comes 
to be reversed for the designation of the production of something in words, that 
poiēsis as “poesy” becomes the special name for the art of the word, poetic 
creation, testifies to the primacy of such art within art as whole.  Therefore it is 
not accidental that when Plato brings to speech and to decision the relationship of 
art and truth he deals primarily and predominantly with poetic creation and the 
poet. (165, original emphasis).  
8 For an insightful analysis of the resonances of the ancient Greek term and theme of 
politeia in contemporary Western political theory, see Brown (38-39). 
 
9 The Republic of Plato, translated and introduced by Allan Bloom, 1968, 397e.  Thereafter 
cited as Republic. 
10 The Greek verb “τρέπω” (trepo> “τροπή,” tropē, “τρόπος,” tropos, and στροφή, strophē 
> strephein) indicates the figure of turning and twisting, but also, in the context of ancient 
Greek theater, the movement of the chorus in turning from right to left of the stage, while, 
at the same time, performing the choric song. 
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11 Although the aisthesis of the spectator is not quite as manifestly essential as the sensory 
involvement of the creator, the sensuousness of perception has certainly a role to play in 
the world of the Nietzschean conjoining of “wisdom” and “folly” in which the experience of 
art consists: aisthētikos [sensitive] < aisthanesthai [to perceive]. The etymological affinity 
between αἰσθάνοµαι (to perceive) and ἀΐω (to hear), is not accidental. 
12 Although there is an aesthetic ideology underlying such Nietzschean themes, Giorgio 
Agamben is right to point out: “There is no such thing as Nietzsche’s aesthetics because 
Nietzsche never thought of art starting from aesthesis, from the spectator’s sensuous 
apprehension –and yet it is in Nietzsche’s thought that the aesthetic idea of art as the opus 
of an operari, as a creative-formal principle, attains the furthest point of its metaphysical 
itinerary.” (Agamben 85).  
13 A disclaimer concerning the resonance of Nietzschean “joyousness” is in order at this 
juncture: it should not be understood merely as a blissful state of redemption.  Rather, it 
signals a complex interlacement of the experience of nothingness and the experience of the 
approbation of life; the contemporaneity of monstrosity and divinity.  Akin to what he calls 
“pessimism of the future” (Gay Science 370), Nietzsche’s eternal joy of becoming –self-
generation of the will to power- brings into itself the eternal joy, and the abyss, of 
annihilation.     
14 The distinction between an art deriving from an abundance (“over-fullness”) of life and 
an art emerging from the wish to overcome or even destroy life is developed in Gay Science, 
in “What is Romanticism?”  Nietzsche asks: “is it hunger or superabundance that has here 
become creative?”  This question becomes the point of departure for his drawing the 
distinction between the desire to fix and immortalize (the desire for being) and the desire 
for destruction and change (the desire for becoming). Nietzsche cautions against a clear-
cut and unambiguous construal of this distinction. The desire for destruction, for instance, 
can be a creative force as much as the will to immortalize can be the tyrannic will to force a 
binding law.   
15 This difference reinstates and complicates the Aristotelian distinction between poiesis 
that denotes production in the sense of a means in view of an end and praxis that signals 
action as an end without means.  
16 For an analysis of the multi-layered pervasiveness of the imitative strategy in Politeia, 
see Baracchi 101. As Baracchi eloquently explains, Socrates’ resorting to mimesis becomes 
even more forceful and poietically effective by virtue of the strong reservations against 
mimesis that he articulates in the course of the dialogue.  This is about a movement against 
mimesis, which transpires within mimesis itself. Also, the elision of the figure of Plato, the 
other narrator –or, “the one who does not speak”- emerges as a mimesis of Socrates’ 
mimesis.     
17 In his discussion of representation in the Republic - the process of creating fictive signs 
that they resemble/imitate the “reality” they represent- Plato introduces a dichotomous 
structure of mimesis consisting on one hand of the original, the arche – which is essential, 
mental, absent, same, identical- and on the other hand the copy, the reproduction - which 
is (or, appears to be) unessential, material, present, other, different.  Plato does not only 
differentiate these two components, but he also morally judges them.  The original is 
primary, authentic, true, and real whereas the copy is secondary, deficient, artificial, and 
unreal. 
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18 The notion of the performative, as it has been developed by J. L. Austin in his speech act 
theory and has been reworked by Judith Butler and Jacques Derrida, is crucial in my 
renderings here in elucidating mimesis as a potential means of critical engagement with 
discursive and symbolic structures. For Butler, performativity has enabled a powerful 
appreciation of the ways that gendered identities are constructed iteratively or interpellated 
(summoned, hailed into subjectivity) through complex citational processes.  In Derrida’s 
theorization of citationality, a sign and its meanings can never be delimited by its original 
context, authorized convention, and authorial intention; every sign can be deterritorialized 
from its original context and grafted onto another one, and thus made to signify differently 
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